What can you tell him? This has special implications for the Asean region, where Muslims and Buddhist coexist as the two largest religious communities. Through detailed analysis of online social data, argued evidence is provided that Muslim Sri Lankans are now at the receiving end of Islamaphobic rhetoric, even violence, from Sinhala Buddhist nationalist organisations, driven by a belief that the Muslim community represent a threat to Buddhism. Islam first came to south Asia around the 12th century, and much of the region came under the rule of the Muslim Mogul empire at about the time this mosque was built. Extremist Buddhist leaders justify their attacks on the places of worship of minorities by arguing that Sri Lanka is the promised land of the Sinhalese Buddhists to safeguard Buddhism. That bloodshed left more than 100 people dead and saw thousands of homes torched by mobs. In the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, Buddhist monks lead rioters in some instance.
In July, the Burmese courts sentenced 25 Buddhists to up to 15 years in prison for murder and other crimes during the riot. Another Ladakhi Raja, Nima Namgyal, was married to a Muslim princess, Zizi Khatun, who is said to have exercised a major role in running the affairs of the kingdom. There are so many foreign funded groups within Sri Lanka who are trying to create religious and ethnic unrest. Over the last two years accusations of sexual assault and local disputes have created a flashpoint for violence that has quickly escalated into widespread communal clashes. As such, this article explores the implications and root causes of violence in Ampara and Kandy. In this paper I will discuss the case of Sinhala revenge literature as an example where karma is seen as a force of punishment, and, unlike with merit transfer, the motive is malicious and intemperate.
This article is descriptive and interpretative in nature and mainly relies on secondary data. International rights groups have urged Myanmar's democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi to grant the Rohingya citizenship. In response, a Buddhist mob armed with machetes and bamboo poles torched a mosque, a Muslim orphanage, and several shops after the police refused to surrender Ne Win. For Hindu nationalists this 16th-century mosque symbolized Muslim domination of their land. This chapter also analyses how discourses on religious identity play out in everyday life and how economic rivalries over fishing resources spill over into—or are reinforced by—religious and ethnic tensions in the post-war context.
These nationalist groups regard themselves as defenders of Buddhism who want to restore the supposed ailing state of Buddhism across the country. Professor Ronan Lee at Deakin University asserts that in the aftermath of the democratic transition, media reforms and liberalization has afforded Wirathu and others the means to spread their message more widely. One person died and nine were injured. The train was carrying Hindu activists returning from the site of a long-simmering dispute over ground claimed as sacred both by Hindus and Muslims. In this paper I will be attempting to explain this sensitivity in reference to three factors. The train attack sparked some of the worst religious violence seen in India since it was partitioned in 1947 by the departing British. There is the case where a certain person, abandoning the taking of life, abstains from the taking of life.
While the ideals of Buddhist canonical texts promote peace and pacifism, discrepancies between reality and precepts easily flourish in times of social, political and economic insecurity, such as Myanmar's current transition to democracy. Our findings indicate that people take advantage of the malleable nature of seemingly static religious doctrine to mix, match and choose from different religions to suit the current need and the occasion. These fears surely feed into the above panic around Fonterra and dairy products. Such marriages occurred among both 'ordinary' people as well as among the royalty. From Burma to Sri Lanka: does a link exist? Southeast Asia has a population of 618 million, made up of 42 per cent 240 million Muslims and 40 per cent 150-190 million Buddhists.
They enjoy a large following throughout the country. The Rohingya victims now scrape by in squalid refugee camps beyond the city boundaries. Because the Mahavamsa was written in Pali, few Sinhalese could read it until its translation. In this way, Sinhala Buddhist identity continues to be influenced by the Buddhist revivalism of the 1880s in which Sri Lankan Buddhism was constructed as an ideology under attack by outside forces. In Sri Lanka, the issue of halal slaughter has been a flashpoint.
In June 2014, deadly anti-Muslim riots in Srilanka led by Buddhist monk Galagoda Atte Gnanasara, who is described by some as Srilanka Ashin Wirathu, started. The video also shows the burning and killing of at least two Muslim students at the hands of rioters, which included Buddhist monks. As early as 1915, riots against Muslims led by Buddhist nationalists resulted in a familiar scenario as witnessed in 2014, where the main targets of the rioting and looting were Muslim shopkeepers and businesses. In an to Burmese President Thein Sein, dated July 22 and published on Islamic fundamentalist websites days before the Sunday bombing, he threatened to wage a war if Muslims continue to be harmed there. Known for its colorful Lunar New Year celebrations and visits from celebrity monks, Ekayana last made headlines in 2012, when it was cited as proof of the being shown toward Chinese Indonesians — a minority that has had to cope with decades of social exclusion and repression. The principle of non-violence is intrinsic to the doctrine, as stressed in the Dhammapada, a collection of sayings attributed to the Buddha.
It has been noted that the strongest anti-West sentiments accompany the anti-Christian violence since the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists identify Christianity with which they think is conspiring to undermine Buddhism. The fault line between Buddhist and Muslim worlds is not an inevitable result of essentially clashing civilizations, but an actively constructed transnational phenomena serving to reinforce the legitimacy of the local conflict: by claiming that Buddhism and Islam are fundamentally at odds beyond the local context, the local conflict appears more inevitable and therefore more necessary. The has listed Sri Lanka among the countries with very high in 2012 due to the violence committed by Buddhist monks against and places of worship. As for Indonesia, easily the biggest majority-Muslim country in the region, Muslims have been helping the Rohingyas through donations. Aung describes how the religious conflict between the Muslims and Buddhists contributed to the decrease in the political, economic, and social state of Myanmar. The state is, I argue, re-marketing the armed forces in the post-war phase as a benevolent, positive presence in the Northeast. The reemergence of majoritarian ethno-religious anti-minority nationalist forces and their intensified anti-minority hatred and violence have made it challenging for ethno-religious minorities in Sri Lanka to engage in religious norms and duties.